Can large immigration inflows impact electoral outcomes and specifically, what impact did immigration have on the vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in the United Kingdom? In particular, I focus on how the increase in Polish immigration, the major group of immigrants post 2004, affected votes in favour of leaving the EU. I find a percentage point increase in Polish immigration to the UK to have caused an increase in votes in favour of Brexit of about 2.72-3.12 percentage points, depending on the specification. To obtain exogenous variation in Polish immigration, I collect data from the archives that reveals the location of Polish War Resettlement Camps after Word War II, which location is plausibly exogenous to current political outcomes. Discussing potential mechanisms, I examine public opinion data in the British Election Study 2015 and find evidence of adversity towards immigration to be a root cause. Other considerations such as the National Health Service (NHS), incumbency and the general trust in politicians as well as the political institutions seem not to play a role.
Introduction
Do large immigration inflows causally affect voting for right wing and populist parties?
Specifically, I analyse what role Polish immigration played in the vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in the United Kingdom (UK).
On the 23rd of June 2016 the UK decided by referendum to exit the European Union (EU). Given the that on the campaign trail a disproportionate amount of erroneous information (fake news) and false promises were made by the "Leave. EU" campaign, voting in favour of Brexit can be considered as a proxy for populist and identity based voting (Browning (2018) ). A major topic in the debate prior to the referendum was the impact of increased immigration to the UK in recent years, especially from Eastern and Central European countries many of which joined the EU in 2004. Specifically, proponents of leaving the European Union wanted to regain control of their borders ( "Take back control") and thus mitigate migration flows, which is not possible when being part of the EU, given the free movement of people within the EU. The UK's membership of the EU meant that the free movement of people in Europe was non-negotiable. Exiting the EU however would allow the UK to independently determine its immigration policy. Throughout the campaign there was increased scrutiny of migrant communities, especially the Polish community. In order to estimate the causal impact of immigration I rely on an instrumental variable analysis. After World War 2 Polish army officers fighting in the Royal Air Force and general infantry were allowed to move with their families to the UK. The government then assigned them to War Resettlement Camps, which location is arguably orthogonal to political outcomes in the 21st century for many reasons. First of all the camps were meant to be temporary allowing for Polish families to slowly repatriate to their home country. To the best of my knowledge and after several visits to the national archives in London, there is no document that determines the choice of location of the camps.
All those camps were mainly composed of Nyssen Huts, hence of a temporary nature.
Therefore it is relatively safe to assume that the initial location of the War Resettlement Camps is orthogonal to local political preferences. The second reason is that only 200 000
Polish soldiers and families were relocated to the UK after the Polish Resettlement Act in 1947. This number is relatively small and an upper bound for the number of Polish people that remained as many repatriated. Therefore the initial migration stock is unlikely to have shaped political opinions locally. In section 5.2 I test an implication of this statement empirically. The last main reason is that Polish immigration is greatly facilitated through the free movement of people at the point of its EU-Accession in 2004. This means that up until then it was quite complex for a Polish citizen to live in the UK. Hence the effect I am picking up is a sudden rise in the inflow of Polish immigrants and not the long-term exposure to Polish chain migration. A majority of migrants relocated through the Polish Resettlement Act though decided to stay in the UK (Biegus and Biegus (2013) ). They then integrated in the local communities and presumably kept links with the mother country. Based on previous pioneering work by Card (2001) , who showed statistically that new migrants allocate close to established immigrant networks, I predict that some new Polish migrants should allocate close to where their ancestors were resettled after WWII. When the EU-accession occurred in 2004, some new Polish migrants will allocate to certain areas for certain, presumably economic, reasons and some will allocated close to their ancestors. If the the ancestors are located in certain areas that for aforementioned reasons are orthogonal to political preferences, then I am able to estimate the causal impact of Polish immigration on voting for Brexit. This paper relates to several strands of the literature.
The most relevant one is the stream examining the impact of immigration on extreme right and populist voting. The most recent publication is by Barone et al. (2016) . In this paper the authors causally estimate the impact of immigration on three national elections using the prior allocation of immigrants before 1992 as an instrumental variable. The exclusion restriction being that a political scandal ("Mani Pulite") led to the creation of completely new parties in 1993. In Halla et al. (forthcoming) , the authors study the impact of immigration on voting in favour of the extreme right in the 1980s to 1990s. To obtain exogenous variation in the allocation of immigrants they use the prior settlement patterns of immigrants in the 1960s. Harmon (forthcoming) determines the impact of immigration to Denmark to have had a positive impact on votes in favour of anti-immigrants nationalist parties. His instrumental variables strategy uses the histor-ical housing stock to address issues of endogeneity. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) study local elections in Hamburg under periods of high immigration to determine that in right wing xenophobic parties gained considerably. On the other hand Mendez and Cutillas (2014) show that the rise of Latin American immigrants led to an increase in votes for the major Left wing party, but an increased immigration from Africa led to more votes for the major right wing party. Brunner and Kuhn (2014) is the only paper that considers referendum outcomes. They determine the impact of cultural distance of immigrants to the native population on referenda about immigration. They instrument for the share of immigrants in the municipality by using local labour market conditions. What most of those papers have in common is that the instrument used to achieve exogenous variation in the allocation of new immigrants relies on the "shift-share" instrument introduced by Card (2001) . This paper in this instance goes two steps further. Other (more recent) papers have started studying the role that politics play in immigration policy (Gamalerio (2018) ) as well as studying the role the refugee crisis has had on extreme right voting ( Steinmayr (2018) and Vertier and Viskanic (2018) ). Both papers find negative effects of refugees on Far Right Nationalist parties in Austria and France respectively. The instruments used are very similar, Steinmayr (2018) uses group housing to instrument for the allocation of refugees, whereas Vertier and Viskanic (2018) use holiday villages all over France.
Many papers have in turn analysed the impact of immigration to the UK, especially on the labour market.
2 Dustmann et al. (2014) use data from the British Labour Force survey to estimate the impact of immigration in both a theoretical and empirical fashion.
They find the skillset of immigrants to be very similar to the one of natives and no strong effects on aggregate employment, participation, unemployment and wages. Specifically Manacorda et al. (2011) find that the mild effects of immigration on the UK labour market are due to the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. Related to this, Gilpin et al. (2006) use the 2004 accession wave of immigration and find no discernible evidence on unemployment claims. The authors paint a picture of a flexible UK labour market that has seen a modest, but broadly positive impact of immigration on the economy. Nickell and Saleheen (2015) analyse the specific occupational impact of 2 Wadsworth (2015) provides a comprehensive review on the general impact of immigration on the UK Labour market. immigration, they find small negative effects on wages but a strong impact of immigration on wages in the semi-skilled/unskilled occupational group.
More specifically, this paper is related to a stream in the literature trying to determine the root causes of Brexit, arguably one of the most important political decisions of the UK's and Europe's history. Papers in this stream mostly offer evidence as correlations (Becker et al. (2016) , Arnorsson and Zoega (2016) and Goodwin and Heath (2016) ). I add to these studies by providing an identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of immigration on the Brexit vote outcome.
A relatively new avenue of research considers the impact of rising trade exposure on electoral outcomes and thus on the determinants of populism. Autor et al. (2016) show that increased Chinese competition has led citizens to elect more extreme house representatives by examining congressman's voting records. Dippel et al. (2015) and Malgouyres (2017) examine the impact of rising trade exposure directly on election outcomes and find a positive effect on extreme right wing parties in Germany and France respectively.
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Other studies in political science such as Clarke et al. (2016) or Arzheimer (2009) have shown that anti-immigrant sentiment can give rise to votes in favour of extreme right wing parties.
4,5
Having those streams of the literature in mind, my contributions are both methodological and in terms of data generation.
First of all, I study one the most important political election in Europe's history and show the causal impact of large immigration inflows on the Brexit vote.
Secondly, I causally estimate the impact of large immigration inflows using a presumable exogenous instrument, which relies on pre-existing settlements. In the process of constructing the instrument I generate new data regarding the location of War Resettlement Camps, which could help further research in reconstructing migrant group earlier than available censuses.
The next section outlines the historical context, Section 3 formulates the empirical and identification strategy, Section 4 provides the main empirical results, Section 5 presents some robustness checks and a falsification exercise (5.2) and Section 6 concludes.
Historical Context
The largest group of Non-British troops that fought in the Royal Air Force and general infantry during World War 2 were born in Poland. Also, occupied Poland's exiled government was located in London. As a result of the service of the Polish people in the British army, Churchill told parliament in 1945: "His Majesty's government will never forget the debt we owe to the Polish troops. I earnestly hope it will be possible for them to have citizenship and freedom of the British empire, if they so desire." Pittsburgh-Post-Gazette In 2016, the number of Polish born residents reached about 1 million, which at the time of writing makes it now the largest group of immigrants in the UK. This is implied by "overtaking India". 
In this case P olish i P opulation i will be the amount of people born in Poland that live in a certain LA over the total population in that LA expressed in percentage points.
7 Ω i are both current and past economic, social as well as geographic controls i.e. the natural logarithm Since the location was temporary and rural, the distance to the centroid of the closest LA should be the best proxy to predict allocation of Polish immigrants in the future, as this is were their ancestors allocated before. The UK also has a very low number of LAs and hence distance creates more statistical power. The first stage in the 2 Stage-Least-Squares regression can thus be written as:
Where Distance i is the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp. The controls 8 There is some anecdotal evidence that some Polish immigrants were employed in mining and other types of unskilled work after WW2. I have not been able to get the exact number of Polish employees per company, but for future work it could be interesting to weight the distance potentially by industry share or economy strength in order to get a more fine grained measure to predict Polish immigrants allocation. It is unclear though whether this economic weighting might not result in additional concerns of endogeneity as it is not reported, which job the majority of Polish workers performed after WW II.
9 Some scholars (notably Davies (2016) ) have shown that the Leave Vote was especially strong in places, where historically Labour was stronger. With the randomisation exercises in 5.2. on elections in 1973, I avoid this critique.
are the same as in the main specification. Given the aforementioned reasons I expect γ 1 to be negative and highly significant, given that new immigrants should partially sort towards prior established immigrant networks. I fit both a linear first stage (as specified) as well as one using Distance i , Distance 2 i and Distance 3 i as instruments.
10 The reason being the shape of the data shown in Figure 4 .
Empirical Results
In the following sections I present the data description, summary statistics, the main results as well as the main mechanism for the findings. In section 5 I will provide Robustness checks and randomisation exercises (5.2).
Data Description and Summary Statistics
Using the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 11 micro dataset I am able to obtain data on population by country of birth as well as many socio-economic variables i.e. Unemployment, Gross Value Added (at the NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 level) both post-and pre-accession per LA in the United Kingdom, which I include as controls in all the regression. The earliest complete data for every LA in England and Wales is 2004, whereas the most recent available is 2014.
12
From the national archives in the United Kingdom in Richmond, I have collected the location and address of the camps, where former polish soldiers were allocated after WW2.
In order to calculate the distance from the LA to the War Resettlement Camp I use the centroid of the municipality.
The public opinion data is retrieved from the British Election study in 2015 collected
by Fieldhouse et al. (2016) . This is a survey on political attitudes carried out on a representative part of the British electorate. Here I recode certain variables and aggregate them to the NUTS2 level and assign them to the LAs in question (further details below). The observed Unit is the LA. GVA is calculated using the income approach and I take the natural logarithm. Unemployment, Turnout, vote in favour of Leave and shares of immigrants/natives are measured in percentage points. Population is measured in thousands. Distance as well as latitude and longitude are directly taken from Google Maps. NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 are different classifications for territorial units. 14 In the whole discussion so far, there is no political variable used as control. The most relevant seem potentially the outcomes for European elections. I will explain why including them makes little sense here. In Becker et al. (2016) the authors show that the UKIP vote outcomes for the European Elections in 2014 are very good predictors of the Brexit Vote in 2016. This is consistent with the estimation here. The fact is that in this setting using the outcome of European elections in 2014 as a control, would be committing a fallacy known as "bad control" (Angrist and Pischke (2009) Fitting the first stage in the linear case gives a parameter estimate that is negative and highly significant. The parameter size is -1.15 with standard error of 0.30 (Table 2) .
The First Stage
Parameter estimates do not significantly differ with or without controls. An F-Test for the excluded instrument with controls is 14.7, which puts me in a relatively safe zone for inference. Nevertheless, I will also provide Conditional Likelihood Ratios (CLRs) that are valid even under weak instruments. 
Main Results

Mechanism: Examining Public Opinion Data
One major mechanism through which immigration can shape electoral outcomes is by affecting political preferences. A good way to proxy this is to rely on public opinion surveys. In the following part I re-code parts of the British election study 2015 collected
by Fieldhouse et al. (2016) British society. At the same time, they do not seem to be affected by their future hopes, their belief in democracy and their views on other social issues such as the NHS. On the other hand people seem more aware politically speaking i.e. they did not cast a protest vote, trust their politicians to a greater extent and they are on average more able to name the secretary general of the United Nations. This evidence suggests that the increased vote in favour of leaving the European Union is actually due to additional concern for immigration caused by Polish immigration. 
Robustness
In this section I offer a battery of robustness checks and a falsification exercise (5.2).
Section 5.1. deals with the possibility that I might be picking up effects of many groups of immigrants and not necessarily the one of Polish immigrants. The next subsection looks at whether the initial allocation of Polish War Resettlement camps is related to historical political outcomes and thus checks if I am not picking up a pre-eminent political trend.
I also show graphical evidence of the redrawing of LAs that brakes potential pre-eminent trends in political preferences.
Other Immigrant Groups
In order to show that the War Resettlement Camps uniquely predict the share of Polish people, I run the first stage using as a dependent variable the share of immigrants of all countries except for Poland in 
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The first exercise is to run the main specification controlling for the logarithm of the share of British people. In Table 6 we can see those results. The effects on Turnout still remain non-significant and the impact on Brexit vote is very similar to our main result.
This is the inverse exercise as including all other migrants groups.
Additionally, I carry out another analysis by constructing an instrument based on Card (2001) for the share of British people. I take the latest share of pre-Accession
British natives available (2000) to instrument for the share of British people in the year 2014 and use this as an additional regressor in the main specification. In Table 7 we can see that the results are more pronounced, but of similar magnitude. They remain significant on the Leave vote and not significant on Turnout. (1) and (4) Table 8 we can see that the 2SLS coefficient is not significant on the difference between votes for Conservative and Labour candidates in 1973 local election and also the plain OLS regression of the Distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp yields a very imprecise point estimate.
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Therefore the redrawing of districts has not been deterministic and thus the validity of 19 I use the outcome in local elections as they are aggregated at the LA level. Parliamentary election results are aggregated at the electoral constituency level.
my instrument is unaffected.
20 The first column is the OLS regression and columns (2) and (3) use the linear first stage and the non-linear first stage respectively. 
Outmigration
Immigration can have effects on the composition of the voting population across areas.
In this section I test whether the immigration of Polish people has possibly led to the displacement of natives. It could be that Polish immigration displaced native voters, which in turn could affect voting outcomes if natives do not have representative political opinions. In Table 9 one can see the result of regressing the instrumented share of Polish people on the share of net outmigrants defined by I find that the effect is mostly due to people's concern for immigration and that other often cited considerations do not seem to play a role.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First of all, I propose a credible identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of immigration on voting outcomes when precise census data is not available. Furthermore I explain partially one of the most important elections in Britain's and also the EU's history. In the process of data collection of this paper I generate new original data from the archives, which contributes to the digitization of historical data to be used in the social sciences.
• (7) Democracy On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the democracy works in this country? Very satisfied is coded as 1, fairly satisfied is coded as 2, "don't know" is coded as 2.5, a little dissatisfied is coded as 3 and very dissatisfied is coded as 4.
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